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S T A T E M E N T OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§78A-3-lO2(3)O),78A-4-lU3(2)0.
S T A T E M E N T OF ISSUES A N D STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1^-i

-i.nl court abuse its discrctioi i

I in; :i :t pi n si ini it t I 'tal 1 1 i Ci *. 1- '.

37(g), it imposed sanctions against the Appellants Paul "Cactus Jack" La Marr ("Mr. La
Marr" or "Cactus Jack")., KI , Mac :! unery Pty, I td ("KK Max: :hinery"), and DayNight, T T C
("DayNight") (collectively referred to herein as "Appellants" or the "DayNight Parties") for
destroying W. Cory Rowe's ("Mr. Rowe") 1 laptop computer and hard drive, which were
/i-Light, Inc.'s (^\\l< tbilu.'hf1} trade sa*ui n -. •. - < ••••ns?

evidence cv

Standard of Review: A trial court's discovery sanction decision is reviewed for a
clear abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick v. Bullougb AbatementL////;, 2( )08 I "" I ' S \ ^| 23, I'*'' l\ xl (>57.
Preservation: Appellants preserved the issue in the DayNight Parties' Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant Mobilight, Inc.'s M i' -n f< >r Terminating Sanctions, (R. 561.)
I-,
judgment on Mobilight's First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth
Claims for Relief in — •
when Appellant

''oimterclaim an*, i

-.- • .r.-\ i • :.;v»int

.a Marr an.: \r i\. >we intentionally destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop

computer and hard drive, which were evidence central t< > Mobilight's trade secret-related
claims?

1

Mr. Rowe had been a party to Appellants' appeal, but his appeal was dismissed with
prejudice bv order of this C< >urt on /April 29, 2010, as reflected in the record.
6

Standard of Review: A trial court's discovery sanction decision is reviewed for a
clear abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick, ^f 23.
Preservation: Appellants preserved the issue in the DayNight Parties' Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant Mobilight, Inc.'s Motion for Terminating Sanctions. (R. 561.)
Issue 3: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it awarded final judgment to
Mobilight in the amount of $120,692.07 for Mobilight's reasonable attorney's fees and costs
incurred with respect to its default judgment against the Appellants?
Standard of Review: A trial court's award of attorney's fees is reviewed for a clear
abuse of discretion. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998).
Preservation: Appellants preserved the issue in the DayNight Parties' Memorandum
in Opposition to Mobilight, Inc.'s Motion for Final Entry of Default Judgment. (R. 726.)
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L PROVISIONS. STATUTES. A N D RULES
A.

Statutes: The following Utah statute is reproduced in the Addendum: The Utah

Uniform Trade Secret Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-1, et seq.
B.

Rules
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(g):

Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent power of the court to
take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers
with or fails to preserve a document, tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in
violation of a duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a
result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.
UtahR. Civ. P. 37(b)(2):
b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an order entered
under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a
person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
7

order to provide or pernlit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of thi^
rule or Rule 3 5 , , unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the cou1; w •
which the action is pending may take such action in regard to the failure as are just, including
the following:
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the purposes of
the action in accordance with tlR claii11 of the party obtaining the order;
(b)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or o[ i
defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence;

mg designated clai

(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed,
dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by default against
the disobedient party;
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney
fees, caused by the failure;
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, otl i< ;i t l =11 i a t i c i l< :i t.< • vi lbi :i tit r ' a \. 1 i ' • leal or
mental examination, as contempt of court; and
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference.

s i A. r;E,.i\ IEN roF ;n m CASE
N a t u r e of the Case: Mobilight brought this action as a counterclaim and third party
complaint involving misappropriation of its trade secrets and confidential proprietary
information which Appellants used to get into the light tower manufacturing business and
directly compete with Mobilight. At the very beginning of the case, Mr. La Marr and Mr.
R .' A " ""( * in it'i "i iti' ' i lallv It "isii )• '< 'd i vli R ' : , < ""s la] >to] ) con. i.| in it< "t ai :i< 1 1 lat d dt i •< ' tl lat a n itaii icd
evidence of the misappropriation of Mobilight's trade secrets.
Coi u se of Pi < :i ceedii lgs ai id Disp :: sitic i I B e k : r: Da "I \igl it stat t< :d the action by
filing a complaint for trespass against Mobilight on July 25, 2008. (R. 1.) On .August 22,
2008, Mobilight filed a counterclaim against DayNight and third-party claims against Mr. T a
Marr, Air. Kow t.

icry, for the mi^r8

• lobiiigiu s ti\i. ;• M crets

and confidential proprietary information, breach of contract, conversion, and injunctive
relief. (R. 46.) Mobilight also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction on August 22, 2008. (R. 117.) After an oral argument hearing on
September 3, 2008 (R. 313), the district court granted Mobilight's motion for a temporary
restraining order on September 5, 2008 (R. 321), and on September 16, 2008, the court
formalized in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Temporary Restraining Order.
(R. 399.) After evidentiary hearings held on October 7, 8, and 30, 2008 (R. 483, 484, 554),
the court granted Mobilight a preliminary injunction against the Appellants on November
14,2008. (R. 583.)
On October 15, 2008, Mobilight filed its motion for sanctions regarding the
intentional destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop computer and hard drive. (R. 486.) The court
granted Mobilight's motion for sanctions on March 24, 2009, and granted Mobilight default
judgment on its First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth claims for
relief. (R. 656.) The court later granted Mobilight's Motion for Entry of Final Judgment as
provided in the court's Memorandum Decision dated November 10, 2009. (R. 831.) (Copy
in Addendum.) The trial court granted Rule 54(b) certification to the judgment. (R. 832.)
The trial court also found in the Memorandum Decision on November 10, 2009, that "the
apportioned amount of fees sought is appropriate and necessarily incurred in furtherance of
Mobilight's trade secret-related claims, and that the amount of fees and costs requested is
reasonable in light of the complexity of the case and the scope of the litigation." (R. 833.)
The Final Judgment was entered in the Registry of Judgments on November 18, 2009. (R.
840.) Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on December 10, 2009. (R. 847.)

9

S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 2
Third-party defendant and appellant Paul La Marr, a / k / a "Cactus Jack," is general
manager of third-party defendant KK Machinery. (Tr. 586, ^f 9.) Mr. La Marr is also a
member and general manager of DayNight, LLC. (R. 586, ^f 9.) Mr. La Marr photographed
Mobilight's process of manufacturing its light towers. (R. 587, ^j 14.)
After Mr. Rowe left his employment with Mobilight, he began work officially for KK
Machinery and/or DayNight in a position or nearly identical to or nearly identical to his
former Operations Manager position with Mobilight. (R. 588, ^j 20.)
Mobilight holds trade secrets as defined in the Utah Uniform Trade Secret Act, § 1324-1, et seq., and paragraph 2a of the Property Protection Agreements. (R. 593, ^f 31.)
Mr. Rowe, Mr. La Marr, and DayNight's source of suppliers is from Mobilight's confidential
information. (R. 589, ^ 26.)
On June 2, 2008, Mr. Rowe was requested to return the hard drive from his laptop
computer that contained Mobilight's confidential proprietary information, including
information regarding Mobilight's customers, vendors, costs, pricing, and technical
information regarding Mobilight's production methods. (R. 588, ^J 21.) Mr. Rowe was even
offered a brand new hard drive so that he could keep the computer itself. (Id.) However,
Mr. Rowe replied that he "would have to check with Karl [Prall] and Cactus Jack of KK
Machinery." Instead of responding to Mobilight's request, Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe
destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop computer. (R. 658.) The trial court found that Mr. Rowe's
2

While Mobilight agrees with much of the Appellants' Statement of Facts, Mobilight
expressly does not agree with paragraphs 7, 19, 23, 24, 26, 33, 38, and 58 of Appellants'
Statement of Facts. Mobilight sets out here an abbreviated Statement of Facts that more
fully reflects the record in the trial court as to the pertinent facts.
10

refusal to return the hard drive from his laptop computer which contained Mobilight's
confidential, proprietary trade secret information supports the reasonable inference and
finding that Mr. Rowe intended to wrongfully use and/or did wrongfully use Mobilight's
protected information. (Id.)
On July 30, 2008, while video recording the destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop
computer, Mr. La Marr stated that he and Mr. Rowe were "about to destroy any final,
potential harmful evidence that might link us to any sort of lawsuit to Mobi-Light
regarding their concerns about intellectual property." (R. 662.) (Emphasis in original.)
Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe "chose to willfully and in bad faith destroy the laptop in
order to permanently deprive Mobi-Light and the trial court of the evidence contained on
the laptop. (R. 662.) The destruction of the laptop computer will cause substantial prejudice
to Mobi-Light because the destruction of the evidence contained on the hard drive of the
laptop will leave the jury to speculate regarding the nature and extent of Mobi-Light's
confidential information contained on the hard drive and whether that information was
actually being accessed, transferred and/or used. (R. 662.) The evidence on the laptop
"goes to the heart of Mobi-Light's claims and is the central and most direct evidence of
DayNight's and the third-party defendants' alleged wrongdoing." (R. 663.) The intentional
destruction of the laptop computer permanently deprives Mobilight and the trial court of the
evidence contained on the laptop computer. (R. 588, ^[ 22.)
The trial court granted Mobilight a Preliminary Injunction against DayNight, Mr.
Rowe, Mr. La Marr, and K K Machinery on November 14, 2008, enjoining them from using
or disclosing any of Mobilight's confidential proprietary information and enjoining Mr.

11

Rowe and Mr. La Marr from working in any capacity for the K K Machinery/DayNight light
tower joint venture. (R. 598-599.) The trial court also granted Mobilight its attorney's fees
and costs incurred in obtaining the Temporary Restraining Order dated September 16, 2008,
as well as with respect to the Preliminary Injunction as provided in the Utah Uniform Trade
Secret Act and the respective written agreements between the DayNight defendants and
Mobilight. (R. 599.)
SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T S
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Mobilight default judgment as
the sanction for the intentional destruction of the computer hard drive evidence. Appellants
had a duty to preserve evidence, and the video of the destruction unequivocally confirms
that Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe knew they were destroying "harmful evidence" and did so to
take unfair advantage of Mobilight in the litigation. The conduct was subject to sanction
under Utah R. Civ. P. 37(g) even though there was no pre-existing discovery order and even
though Appellants had not previously engaged in a pattern of destroying evidence. The
intentional destruction of evidence deprives Mobilight and the court of the central evidence
to Mobilight's trade secrets-based case and is a direct affront to the justice system. Due to
the Appellants' willfulness and bad faith, default judgment is the only appropriate remedy.
Neither did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Mobilight judgment for its
attorney's fees and costs. Mobilight apportioned its attorney's fees and costs request as
required, and the amount of its attorney's fees and costs were reasonable in light of the
complexity of the litigation and the results achieved. For these reasons, Mobilight
respectfully requests that the Final Judgment of the Third District Court be affirmed.

12

ARGUMENT
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting Mobilight default judgment
as sanctions for the intentional destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop computer. Appellants also
argue that the trial court erred in awarding Mobilight attorney's fees and costs. The record
confirms that the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in granting Mobilight default
judgment for Appellants' intentional destruction of evidence. Nor did the trial court abuse
its discretion in granting Mobilight final judgment for its award of attorney's fees and costs.
A trial court's remedy for discovery abuses is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. SFR, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2008 UT App 31, \ 9, 177 P.3d 629. In applying the
abuse of discretion standard, a district court is given "a great deal of latitude in determining
the most fair and efficient manner to conduct court business" because the district court
judge "is in the best position to evaluate the status of his [or her] cases, as well as the
attitudes, motives, and credibility of the parties." Bode11 Construction Company v. Robbins, 2009
UT 52, H 35 (2009), 215 P.3d 933, quoting Morton v. ConflBaking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275
(Utah 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a district court will be determined to
have "abused its discretion in choosing which sanction to impose only if there is either an
erroneous conclusion of law or no evidentiary basis for the [district] court's ruling." Bode/I, ^|
35, quoting Morton, 938 P.2d at 274 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Appellate review of a district court's imposition of sanctions follows a two-step
process. "First, we ensure that the district court has made a factual finding that the party's
behavior merits sanctions. Second, once the factual finding has been made, we will only
disturb the sanction if'abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown."' Kilpatrick v. Bullough

13

Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, P23, 199 P.3d 957 (Utah 2008), quoting Morton, 938 P.2d at 274
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a general rule, district courts
are granted a great deal of deference in selecting discovery sanctions, and sanctions are
overturned only in cases evidencing a clear abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick, ^| 23 (citation and
quotation omitted). An abuse of discretion may be demonstrated by showing that the
district court relied on "an erroneous conclusion of law" or that there was "no evidentiary
basis for the trial court's ruling." Id. (citation omitted). Deferential review recognizes that
"trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the discovery process." Id., quoting
Utah Dep'tofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
I.

T H E DISTRICT COURT ACTED W I T H I N ITS DISCRETION
W H E N IT IMPOSED DEFAULT J U D G M E N T AGAINST T H E
APPELLANTS FOR DESTROYING E V I D E N C E CENTRAL T O
MOBILIGHT'S CLAIMS.
Appellants do not seriously contest that their intentional destruction of the laptop

computer warrants sanctions under Utah R. Civ. P. 37(g). Instead, the Appellants argue that
the default judgment sanction issued against them is too harsh, and in trying to advance their
appeal, refer to procedural standards that do not apply to application of Rule 37(g).
The Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion because it "lacked an
evidentiary basis." (Appellants' Brief at 16.) To the contrary, the district court had the
benefit of direct evidence in the form of a video of W. Cory Rowe and Appellant Paul
"Cactus Jack" La Marr showing them destroying Mr. Rowe's laptop computer, a computer
which they identified in the video to be "harmful evidence." The trial court noted that the

14

existence of the video evidence showed Mr. Rowe's and Mr. La Marr's disregard for the
court and the judicial process. (R. 663.)
Appellants also argue that the district court abused its discretion because it did not
explicitly find that the Appellants acted "willfully" in destroying Mr. Rowe's laptop
computer. (Appellant's Brief at 16.) There is no requirement for a district court to make any
determination about the "willfulness" of a party's behavior under Rule 37(g). Regardless,
because the district court ruled that the Appellants acted "purposely" and "intentionally" in
destroying the laptop computer, the district court found that the Appellants held the
requisite culpability to warrant the sanction of default judgment. 3

(R. 663.)

Finally, Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion because the
Appellants did not engage in a "consistent pattern" of disregarding court orders or discovery
requirements. (Id. at 17.) As stated in Rule 37(g), a district court's sanctioning power under
Rule 37(g) reflects the court's inherent authority, and the rule does not require that the
district court first have issued any orders regarding discovery before it may sanction a party
for destroying evidence. For these reasons and those outlined below, the district court's
decision should be affirmed.
A. T H E R E IS AMPLE E V I D E N C E T O SUPPORT T H E DISTRICT
COURT'S SANCTION OF D E F A U L T J U D G M E N T .

3

"The willfulness standard in this context is low. Willfulness has been interpreted to mean
"any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary noncompliance. N o wrongful
intent need be shown."' Welsh v. Hospital Corp. <?/Utah, 2010 UT App. 171, \ 12, 235 P.3d
791, quoting Utah Dep'tofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4,8 (Utah 1995).
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In the preliminary injunction hearing on October 7 and 8, 2008, the trial court viewed
the July 30, 2008, D V D video Mr. La Marr made of the destruction of the laptop. (R. 482.)
The statements of Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe on the video included the following:
1.

Mr. La Marr clearly stated in the July 30, 2008 video as follows:
"We are about to destroy any final, potential harmful evidence that
might link us to any sort of lawsuit to Mobilight regarding their
concerns about intellectual property. We have decided we have not
used Cory's laptop. We have not in any way used that information that
he has gleaned from Mobilight. We think it is best to destroy it."

(R. 492.)
2.

Further memorializing their intention to destroy evidence, verbalizing their

understanding of the gravity of what they were doing, and emphasizing their callous
disregard for Mobilight's rights and complete disrespect of the judicial system, Mr. La Marr
and/or Mr. Rowe further stated in the July 30, 2008, video, after they broke the computer
into pieces, and smashed the hard drive with a hammer, as follows:
"Now, let's package it up and send it to Mobilight."
"The laptop has been destroyed. Fully."
"OK. If this gets us into trouble, I hope we're prison buddies."
"The information is destroyed."
(R. 492-493.)
The video of the destruction of the laptop computer and the statements of Mr. La
Marr and Mr. Rowe recorded in the video, during and immediately after the destruction of
the computer, provided ample and direct evidence for the district court to base its default
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judgment sanction upon. The Appellants do not offer any cogent argument as to why they
believe there was not a sufficient evidentiary basis for the district court's sanction.
The district court explicitly found that there was "direct evidence" of the intentional
destruction of the computer evidence, and that said intentional destruction of evidence
significantly prejudiced Mobilight. In its Memorandum Decision dated March 29, 2009, the
trial court stated as follows:
In this case, there is direct evidence of Mr. Rowe's and Cactus Jack's intentional
destruction of relevant evidence for the purpose of hiding potential damaging
information. Further, there is a significant level of prejudice to Mobi-Light because
the evidence at issue goes to the heart of Mobi-Light's claims and is the central and
most direct evidence of DayNight's and the third-party defendants' alleged
wrongdoing. Next, the actual videotaped destruction of the evidence creates an
extraordinary circumstance which demonstrates Mr. Rowe's and Cactus Jack's
disregard for the Court and the judicial process. Considering these factors in their
totality, the Court is persuaded that the level of culpability is such that Default
Judgment is warranted and that a less drastic sanction would not be appropriate
under these unique circumstances. Accordingly, Mobi-Light's Motion for Sanctions
is granted.
(R. 663.) In short, because there was video evidence of the computer's destruction and
concurrent statements from Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe as to their state of mind at the time
of the destruction, the district court had an extraordinary evidentiary basis upon which to
issue its default judgment sanction.
B. T H E DISTRICT COURT D I D N O T HAVE T O F I N D E V I D E N C E OF
WILLFULLNESS, BAD FAITH, FAULT, PERSISTENT DILATORY
TACTICS, OR R E P E A T E D VIOLATIONS OF COURT ORDERS AS A
PREDICATE T O IMPOSING D E F A U L T J U D G M E N T U N D E R
RULE 37(g).
Contrary to the Appellants' argument, Rule 37(g) does not necessarily require a trial
court to find evidence of "willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics" predicate
to imposing sanctions for destruction of evidence. Rule 37(g) contains no requirement that
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a trial court must find that a party acted with "willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent
dilatory tactics" before it may impose sanctions for destruction of evidence. Rule 37(g)'s
reference to Rule 37(b)(2)?s laundry list of possible sanctions as punishment for violation of
Rule 37(g) does not also mean that caselaw interpreting application of Rule 37(b)(2), that
requires that there be evidence of "willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics,"
applies to enforcement of Rule 37(g). Rule 37(g) provides as follows:
Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent power of the
court to take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals,
alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a document, tangible item, electronic data or
other evidence in violation of a duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may
not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically
stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an
electronic information system.
Rule 37(g) contains no language referring to a party's state of mind or intention with respect
to what it does to alter or destroy evidence. Rule 37(g)'s reference to Subdivision (b)(2) is
for the limited purpose of referring the trial court to the list of available sanctions under that
rule, and Rule 37(g)'s reference to Subdivision (b)(2) does not make application of Rule 37(g)
ipso facto impliedly dependent upon restrictions found in case law regarding the application of
the sanctions listed under Subdivision (b)(2). Subdivision (b)(2) deals with various other
orders.
Rule 37(g) specifies that a court has an inherent power to take "any action authorized
by Subdivision (b)(2) [.]" A court's authority to sanction contemptuous conduct is both
statutory and inherent. Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, f36 (2005), 123 P.3d 416 (detailing the
procedures governing contempt) and In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217, 224 (Utah 1913)
("It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and superior jurisdiction possess certain
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inherent powers not derived from any statute. Among these are the power to punish for
contempt....").
The list of sanctions in Subdivision (b)(2) to Rule 37, including the provision for the
sanction of default judgment, include the following:
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(b)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated
claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by
default against the disobedient party;
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney fees, caused by the failure;
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a physical
or mental examination, as contempt of court; and
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference.
Rule 37(g) became effective in 2007. The minutes of the Utah Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure ("Advisory Committee") that drafted
and adopted the rule do not reflect that a party's state of mind or intent should be
considered in applying the rule. The Advisory Committee discussed in its first meeting
regarding proposed Rule 37(g) that a trial court has "inherent authority" to address
spoliation, but that there was need for a supplementation of that authority to give trial courts
and practitioners a guide.4

4

Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure February, 22,
2006, Minutes at pp. 1-2, available online at
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The Minutes to the Advisory Committee's April 26, 2006, discussions regarding
proposed Rule 37(g) confirm that "The committee supported the suggestion adding that the
reference to subsection (b)(2) is meant to be inclusive of the subparagraphs of (b)(2)"5 It is
evident that the Advisory Committee did not intend Rule 37(g)'s reference to Subdivision
(b)(2) to refer to the first main paragraph of Subdivision (b)(2), which pertains to sanctions
in the event a party fails to obey an order under Rule 16(b), Rule 30(b)(6), Rule 31(a), Rule
37(a), or Rule 35. See Rule 37(b)(2).6 Subdivision (b)(2) of Rule 37 does not mention or
refer to Subdivision (g) of Rule 37. Therefore, it is clear that when a trial court considers
imposing sanctions under Rule 37(g), the trial court is not required to apply case law,
interpreting those sections of Rule 37(b)(2) requiring a court to find "willfulness, bad faith,
fault or persistent dilatory tactics" referred to in Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, ^[ 16, 981
P.2d 407 (Utah 1999), as argued by Appellants.
Finally, contrary to Appellants' argument, there is no requirement in the application
of Rule 37(g) that a party must have repeatedly violated court orders before a court may
sanction a party under the rule. To take the Appellants' argument to its absurd conclusion, it

http://ww^v.utcourts.gov/committees/civproc/20060222/ by clicking on the link for
"Approved Minutes."
5
Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure April 26, 2006,
Minutes at p. 2, available online at
http://\^vw/\utcourts.gov/committees/civproc/20060426/ by clicking on the link for
"Approved Minutes." (Emphasis added.)
6
U.R.C.P. Rule 37(b) provides as follows: "Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If
a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on
behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order
made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, unless the court finds that the failure was
substantially justified, the court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard
to the failure as are just, including the following:"
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is as if Appellants argue that they could not be sanctioned under Rule 37(g) until they first
repeatedly destroyed evidence — the same evidence being destroyed over and over in
violation of a direct court order — in the case in violation of a direct court order. Such a
ridiculous scenario would turn our system of justice on its head and give wrongdoers every
incentive to destroy evidence.
C T H E DISTRICT COURT'S F I N D I N G T H A T T H E APPELLANTS
I N T E N T I O N A L L Y A N D PURPOSELY D E S T R O Y E D T H E
COMPUTER E V I D E N C E SUPPORTED T H E SANCTION OF
DEFAULT J U D G M E N T .
Even though application of Rule 37(g) does not require a trial court to find that a
party acted "willfully" in destroying evidence, the trial court found in its March 24, 2009,
Memorandum Decision that Mr. La Marr and Mr. Rowe intentionally destroyed relevant
evidence for the purpose of hiding potential damaging information, and that their actions
demonstrated their disregard for the trial court and the judicial process. The trial court was
therefore persuaded that their level of culpability warranted default judgment. (R. 663.)
Earlier, in its November 14, 2008, preliminary injunction ruling, the trial court found as fact
that Mr. Rowe and Mr. La Marr intentionally destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop computer and
hard drive, which such intentional destruction "permanently deprives Mobilight and the
Court of the evidence contained on the laptop computer." (R. 588, ^[ 22.) The trial court
also found in the preliminary injunction ruling that the Appellants "purposely" dropped the
computer off the roof of DayNight's building. (R. 590, ^ 27.)
There is no appreciable difference between a party acting "willfully" and one acting
"intentionally" or "purposefully." The words are synonyms. "A willful act may be described
as one done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
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distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly, or inadvertently." Black's
Law Dictionary 1599 (6th ed. 1990). Appellants acknowledge that the trial court found that
that the Appellants "purposely" and ''intentionally" destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop, but
cryptically argue nonetheless that "the evidence does not support that any intentional fault
attributed to [the Appellants] was accompanied by the necessary additional willful behavior."
Aplt. Brf. At 18-19. This is a distinction without a difference. Appellants do not contest
that they purposely and intentionally destroyed the computer.
D.

T H E COMPUTER WAS N O T D E S T R O Y E D "IN GOOD FAITH."

Mr. La Marr stated in the video that "We are about to destroy any final, potential
harmful evidence that might link us to any sort of lawsuit to Mobilight regarding
their concerns about intellectual property. (R. 662.) After the destruction of the laptop
was complete, Appellants stated "Now, let's package it up and send it to Mobilight" and
"OK. If this gets us into trouble, I hope we're prison buddies." (R. 492-493.) By their own
words on the video, Appellants clearly communicated their state of mind in destroying the
computer. Perhaps most importantly, Appellants knew the computer was evidence.
Appellants knew they were doing something very wrong, and mocked Mobilight when they
joked that they could send the destroyed computer to Mobilight. Appellants knew they were
acting to take advantage of Mobilight in the litigation, which had begun with the filing of
DayNight's complaint five days earlier on July 25, 2008.
Appellants do not argue that they destroyed the computer as a result of a "routine,
good-faith operation of an electronic information system [,]" which is the only "good faith"
defense contained in Rule 37(g). Appellants' contention that they destroyed the laptop to
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stop Mobilight from harassing DayNight is belied by the fact that five days before the laptop
was destroyed, Appellant DayNight filed a complaint for trespass versus Mobilight. (R. R.
1.) DayNight had already filed a court action to stop Mobilight's alleged harassment, and
such action certainly imposed upon DayNight and its fellow Appellants a duty to preserve
evidence. In addition, a duty to preserve relevant evidence arises at the point when a
reasonable person has been put on notice of the potential for litigation. Computer Assoc. In?I,
Inc. v. Am. Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166, 169 (D. Colo. 1990) (Pre-litigation correspondence
gave actual notice and created a duty to preserve.) Mobilight had earlier served a demand
letter upon the Appellants, and that letter created a duty to preserve evidence. (R. 189-191.)
Regardless of the Appellant's self-serving post-hoc explanations for their behavior, Appellants
had a duty to preserve evidence.7
Appellants' reliance on Kilpatrick for the proposition that Appellants acted
"reasonably" given the circumstances is misplaced. In Kilpatrick, the district courts in the
two cases dealt with the plaintiffs' failures to follow case management orders. Kilpatrick,
2008 UT 82, \ 2. The plaintiffs were directed in the case management orders to obtain
autopsies following the deaths of a plaintiff. Id. at ^| 3. The district court's decision
dismissing the plaintiffs' claims for failing to procure the required autopsies was reviewed
under Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the district court

Appellants' other explanation that they destroyed the computer "to show Mobilight that
DayNight is not using the laptop" is hardly worth addressing. (Aplt. Brf. at 19.) It is very
easy for any person to copy files from one computer to another through the use of CDROM disks, memory "thumb drives," and even email attachments. Any electronic data files
on Mr. Rowe's laptop could have easily been copied to a memory device or another
computer, and once copied, destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop computer would not have
prevented the Appellants from using the copied electronic data.
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to sanction a party who "fails to obey an order" of the court during discovery "unless the
court finds that the failure was substantially justified." Id. at ^j 22. In contrast, here, the
district court applied Utah R. Civ. P. 37(g), which does not require that there be a preexisting order to trigger its application. Instead, Rule 37(g) is premised on the trial court's
inherent authority to sanction the spoliation of evidence. The trial court in Kilpatrick made
no factual findings as to willfulness, bad faith, or fault as to the claimants' failures to procure
autopsies for their deceased husbands. Id. at ^J 26. Kilpatrick is also distinguishable because
the plaintiffs in that case did not destroy evidence like the Appellants did in the case at bar.
Here, the district court specifically found that the Appellants destroyed the computer
evidence "purposefully" (R. 663) and "intentionally." (Id.) Such findings support the
district court's decision to sanction Appellants with default judgment.
The trial court carefully matched the severity of its default judgment sanction to the
Appellants' state of mind at the time they destroyed the evidence. It is of no consequence
that the trial court did not specifically find that the AppeUants acted with "willfulness." The
trial court found that they acted "intentionally" and "purposely."
E.

T H E LAPTOP COMPUTER WAS T H E ESSENTIAL, CENTRAL
E V I D E N C E T O MOBILIGHT'S CASE.

All of Mobilight's claims, against the Appellants that the district court granted
Mobilight default judgment upon, center upon the electronic data that was contained on Mr.
Rowes laptop. The relevant allegations contained in Mobilight's First Amended
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint are as follows:
• Mobilight alleged in its First Claim for Relief for Breach of Contract against Mr.
Rowe that he breached his Property Protection Agreement with Mobilight (i.e., his
non-disclosure agreement) when he made unauthorized copies and disclosures of
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Mobilight's Confidential Information to third parties and when he when he refused
to return Mobilight's confidential information contained on the hard drive of his
laptop computer. (R. 351, ^ 129; R. 352, ^ 131.)
• Mobilight alleged in its Second Claim for Relief for Breach of Duty of Loyalty
against Mr. Rowe that he breached his continuing duty of loyalty to Mobilight when
he disclosed Mobilight's Confidential Information to K K Machinery, DayNight, and
Cactus Jack and other third parties and when he used Mobilight's Confidential
Information in his employment with the K K Machinery/DayNight joint venture. (R.
353, ^ j 136-137.) The Confidential Information included electronic data stored on
the hard drive of Mr. Rowe's destroyed computer.
• Mobilight alleged in its Third Claim for Relief for Conversion against Mr. Rowe that
he converted Mobilight's computer files when he intentionally kept computer files
belonging to Mobilight. (R. 354-355.)
• Mobilight alleged in Fourth Claim for Relief against Mr. La Marr and K K
Machinery that they breached their Property Protection Agreements with Mobilight
(i.e., their non-disclosure agreements) when they, inter alia, made unauthorized copies
and disclosures of Mobilight's Confidential Information and used Mobilight's
Confidential Information in their work in the K K Machinery/DayNight joint
venture. (R. 357, ^f 155-156.) The Confidential Information included electronic data
stored on the hard drive of Mr. Rowe's destroyed computer.
• Mobilight alleged in its Fifth Claim for Relief against K K Machinery that it
breached its Distributor Agreement with Mobilight by using and disclosing
Mobilight's confidential business information in its light tower joint venture with
DayNight. (R. 358, ^| 162.) The confidential business information included
electronic data stored on the hard drive of Mr. Rowe's destroyed computer.
• Mobilight alleged in its Sixth Claim for Relief against Mr. Rowe, Mr. La Marr, K K
Machinery and DayNight that they violated the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
U.C.A. § 13-24-1, et seq. (UUTSA), when they used Mobilight's trade secrets in the
KK Machinery/DayNight joint venture in the design, manufacture and sale of light
towers and when they disclosed the trade secrets to third parties. (R. 360, \ 168.)
The trade secrets included electronic data stored on the hard drive of Mr. Rowe's
destroyed computer.
• Mobilight alleged in its Tenth Claim for Relief against Mr. Rowe, Mr. La Marr, K K
Machinery, and DayNight that Mr. Rowe and Mr. La Marr that Mobilight should be
granted injunctive relief and that those parties should be enjoined from working for
the KK Machinery/DayNight joint venture pursuant to their respective agreements
with Mobilight, pursuant to Mr. Rowe's continuing duty of loyalty to Mobilight, and
pursuant to Mobilight's rights under the UUTSA. (R. 366, ^j 194.) As alleged in
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Mobilight's First through Sixth Claims for relief, the electronic data stored on Mr.
Rowe's destroyed computer was central to proving Mobilight's claim for injunctive
relief.
• Mobilight alleged in its Thirteenth Claim for Relief against Mr. Rowe, Mr. La Marr,
K K Machinery, and DayNight for destruction of evidence under U.R.C.P. Rule 37(g)
that Mobilight was entitled to default judgment for its First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Claims for relief due to the destruction of the laptop computer
an hard drive. (R. 369-370.)
Each of Mobilight's claims that the district court granted default judgment upon
pertain, to a significant extent, to the electronic data evidence that would have been found
on Mr. Rowe's destroyed laptop computer. Without that computer evidence, Mobilight
cannot prove (and Appellants cannot disprove) exactly what electronic data comprising
Mobilight's confidential proprietary information was contained on the computer.
Appellants' argument that the laptop evidence is not necessary to proving Mobilight's
trade secrets claims fails because Mobilight's Sixth Claim for Relief for violation of the
UUTSA is centered on the computer evidence. Mobilight's rights under the UUTSA,
Mobilight's agreements with the DayNight parties, and Mr. Rowe's duty of loyalty to
Mobilight all relate directly to the security of Mobilight's confidential information contained
in electronic data form. Misappropriation and unauthorized use of Mobilight's electronic
data - regardless of how competitors actually use it - causes damage and irreparable harm to
Mobilight and entitles it to relief. If an aggrieved party seeking relief under the UUTSA had
to prove in every case that the trade secret information was used to virtually copy a
manufactured product (and this is the crux of the argument Appellants proffer), then the
UUTSA would be of little practical utility, because a wrongdoer could simply take trade
secrets without authorization and either pass them on to a third party or make minor
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changes to an end product's design to avoid liability. Indeed, under Utah case law as relied
upon by the Appellants, an employer is entitled to relief for an employee's misappropriation
of confidential information if the employee used or only intends to use the confidential
information. Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-698 (Utah 1981).
Regardless, the trial court found that despite the differences between the designs and
specifications of the Mobilight light towers as compared to the DayNight prototype light
towers, DayNight's prototype is a derivative of and sufficiently similar to Mobilight's light
tower which established that "Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, and DayNight have //J-^/Mobilight's
confidential proprietary information and trade secrets for their own benefits. (R. 591-592, \
591-592.)
Here, the Appellants K K Machinery, DayNight, and Mr. La Marr never worked in
the light tower industry before K K Machinery entered into the distribution agreement with
Mobilight. (R. 587, \ 19.) Because those parties were new to the light tower industry, it is
reasonable to assume that they needed and would have used Mobilight's confidential
information to gain a foothold in the industry.
In addition, although Appellants' argument appears to focus on Mobilight's
confidential light tower design information, Mobilight has alleged that its confidential
electronic data also included information regarding Mobilight's customers, vendors, costs,
pricing, technical information regarding Mobilight's production methods, and Quickbooks
financial information. (R. 351, \ 23.) All of that confidential information has special value
to Mobilight, but is not directly related to the actual physical design and construction of light
towers. Therefore, even though the DayNight prototype light tower may not have been an
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exact copy of Mobilight's design, such circumstance does not mean that the Appellants did
not misappropriate Mobilight's confidential electronic data regarding its customers, vendors,
costs, etc. for the purpose of using it to unfairly compete against Mobilight.
II.

T H E DISTRICT COURT'S SANCTION OF D E F A U L T J U D G M E N T WAS
N O T " U N D D U L Y HARSH."
Because of the prejudice inflicted on Mobilight, the interference with the judicial

process, and the culpability of the Appellants, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sanctioning the Appellants with default judgment. A court has the inherent authority to
strike a party's pleadings and enter a default judgment if the party engages in conduct
designed to improperly influence the court's decision on the merits of the case, such as
perjury or obstruction of justice, or if the conduct itself tends to demonstrate bad faith or a
lack of merit. Chen, 2005 UT 68, ^{43.
While willfulness, bad faith and fault are not necessary to apply Rule 37(g), evidence
of willfulness, bad faith, etc. is reviewed for the selection of the appropriate sanction. Courts
often grant default judgment against wrongdoers for intentional destruction of evidence,
including cases involving the destruction of computers and hard drives. E.g., Metropolitan
Opera Ass'n., Inc. v. Yjocal 100> Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees In?l Union, 212 F.R.D.
178, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (default judgment entered because party's destruction of computer
records was willful and in bad faith); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Cop., 593 F. Supp.
1443, 1455-56 ( C D . Cal. 1984) (default judgment as punishment for the destruction of
documents); Arista Records v. Tschirhart, 241 F.R.D. 462, 466 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (default
judgment versus defendant for willfully destroying critical evidence from her computer after
notice of lawsuit and showing blatant disregard for the judicial process); QZO, Inc. v. Moyer,
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594 S.E.2d 541, 547 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (appellant reformatted computer hard drive prior
to actual production, thereby destroying all evidence on the hard drive; sanction was striking
pleadings and entering judgment); Kucala Enters., Ltd. v. Auto Wax Co., Inc., No. 02-C-1403,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8833 (N.D. 111. May 23, 2003) (plaintiffs action dismissed after
plaintiff in bad faith used a computer program to delete documents from his computer and
"clean" the hard drive); Computer Assoc'sIntl, 133 F.R.D. 166,171 (software developer
defendant destroyed portions of developer's source code which such code could have shown
developer had violated the plaintiffs copyright; court granted plaintiff default judgment as a
sanction); Novell v. Timpanogos Research Group, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1197, 1211 (Utah 4th Dist.
C t , No. 970400339, Jan. 30, 1998) (copy of decision provided to the trial court at R. 621655).
A.

DEFAULT J U D G M E N T IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE
MOBILIGHT SUFFERS SIGNFICANT PREJUDICE D U E T O T H E
DESTROYED EVIDENCE.

Here, default judgment was the appropriate sanction because of the prejudice
Mobilight will suffer due to the destroyed evidence. Mobilight is prejudiced because without
the laptop computer, Mobilight cannot prove what particular confidential information Mr.
Rowe took from Mobilight and used or intended to use in the DayNight/KK Machinery
joint venture. Ultimately, the jury and the trial court would have to speculate what
confidential information was actually taken and used. Appellants argue that even assuming
the laptop showed Mobilight's confidential information was on the hard drive, that
Mobilight could not prove that such information was actually used. (Aplt. Brf. at 24.) This
is not true, because through computer forensics it can be determined when particular
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electronic data files are accessed, and any access of Mobilight confidential information from
the computer could be determined — if only the computer had not been intentionally
destroyed.
Appellants' argument in reliance upon the Muna and Water & Energy Systems Tech., Inc.
v. Keil, 1999 UT 16, 974 P.2d 821 cases, and the proposition in those cases that a court
should compare the similarities and differences in manufactured products to determine if
there has been trade secret misappropriation, actually underscores the prejudice Mobilight
suffered from the computer's destruction. This is because if the factfinder becomes
convinced that there are significant differences in the end products, Mobilight will not have
the laptop computer evidence to also prove misappropriation.
Even if the trial court would give Mobilight "a favorable inference in place of the
evidence," as the Appellants suggest in their opening brief (Aplt. Brf. at 26), the jury will be
left to speculate as to the quantity and quality of Mobilight's confidential electronic data
regarding its manufacturing processes, customers, sales methods, business operations,
financials, supply costs and pricing that existed on the laptop computer—all of which the
Appellants could have accessed to compete with Mobilight and which the jury could
consider in determining whether the Appellants misappropriated Mobilight's trade secrets
and confidential information. That is exactly the position Appellants intended to put
Mobilight in when they intentionally destroyed the coputer evidence, i.e., they wanted to
force the factfinder to only speculate as to what confidential information they took from
Mobilight and speculate as to what they did with it. Therefore, the only appropriate remedy
is entry of default judgment as a sanction.
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B.

DEFAULT J U D G M E N T IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE
D E S T R U C T I O N OF T H E E V I D E N C E I N T E R F E R E S WITH T H E
JUDICIAL PROCESS.

The trial court found that Appellants' actual videotaped destruction of the computer
evidence created an extraordinary circumstance which demonstrated Mr. Rowe's and Mr. La
Marr's disregard for the Court and the judicial process. (R. 663.) The judicial system is
premised on the honesty and good faith efforts of the parties involved. SccQue/a v. PaycoGen. Am. Credits, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6932, 2000 WL 656681, at *7 (N.D. 111. May 18,
2000). Where honesty is replaced with falsehood, a party's right to litigate before a court
comes into question. Id.
Our system of justice depends upon parties' good-faith cooperation in preserving and
presenting evidence for the resolution of disputes. When evidence is intentionally destroyed,
the judicial process is compromised and short-circuited. Cases may then be decided on
incomplete evidence, without the necessary consideration of the true facts underlying the
claims. The justness of the final outcome is compromised. For these reasons, when a party
unilaterally and intentionally alters or destroys the most central evidence in a case, default
judgment is the most appropriate sanction. Here, the Appellants' callous disregard of the
trial court and the judicial process warranted the sanction of default judgment.
C.

DEFAULT J U D G M E N T IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF T H E
OVERWHELMING E V I D E N C E OF T H E APPELLANTS'
CULPABILITY.

Appellants argue that their explanations for destroying the laptop are reasonable
given "their lack of sophistication and experience in corporate litigation matters." This
argument rings hollow because Appellant DayNight was sophisticated enough to file its own
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trespass lawsuit versus Mobilight on July 25, 2008, and was represented by counsel at the
time the computer was destroyed on July 30, and ostensibly could have - and should have consulted with its counsel before destroying evidence.
In addition, the DayNight parties argue they did not exercise bad faith in destroying
the laptop because they have said they have not used Mobilight's information and because
they have testified that they thought destroying the laptop would convince Mobilight to end
its alleged "harassment." (Aplt. Brf. at 19.) Here, their actions in destroying the computer,
and their efforts in hiding Mr. Rowe's early work for DayNight, speak louder than their
words. Regardless, Mr. La Marr's and Mr. Rowe's own words, captured on the July 30, 2008
destruction video, belie whatever stated intentions they now argue motivated their actions.
There is no doubt there was "conscious wrongdoing" because Mr. La Marr himself said in
the video that they were destroying "harmful evidence." Why? To prevent Mobilight and
the Court from ever discovering the evidence. In addition, after the computer and hard
drive were destroyed, they mentioned on the video the possibility of becoming "prison
buddies" with each other. If they truly believed their actions were proper and their
motivations were pure, why the references to destroying "harmful evidence" and becoming
"prison buddies"?
Likewise, there is ample evidence of the DayNight parties' bad faith in destroying the
laptop. If the hard drive really contained "virtually all of DayNight's work product" as
Appellants argue (Aplt. Brf. at 19), it then seems very likely that they took care to copy
DayNight's own work product from the hard drive before they destroyed it, thus preserving
their own material In stark contrast, just a few days after this litigation began, they admittedly
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destroyed "harmful evidence" on the hard drive that they no doubt believed would help
Mobilight prove its claims against them. Only after the laptop's destruction did they
mockingly offer to give the computer to Mobilight. This evidence shows Appellants' bad
faith, prompted by their desire to take an unfair advantage in this litigation. Entry of default
judgment is therefore appropriate. See In re Wechsler, 121 F. Supp. 2d 404, 415 (D. Del.
2000) (Willful or bad faith destruction of evidence intended to prevent other party from
examining evidence warrants default judgment.) N o alternative short of default judgment
will adequately deter the DayNight parties and like-minded litigants from similar conduct.
III.

T H E TRIAL COURT D I D N O T ERR I N AWARDING MOBILIGHT
J U D G M E N T FOR ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES A N D COSTS.
The Second Affidavit of Rinehart L. Peshell sufficiently "apportioned" out the

attorney's fees and costs incurred for work on the claims for relief upon which the trial court
granted judgment. Mr. Peshell specified in his second affidavit that the attorney's fees and
costs reflected in his affidavit pertained to the claims the trial court granted judgment upon,
and that fees and costs related to the other claims were not included. (R. 786-787.)
Mobilight's First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Claims for
Relief upon which the trial court granted Mobilight default judgment all pertain to the
Appellants' misappropriation of Mobilight's confidential information. (R. 657.) The trial
court made a specific finding that Mobilight had adequately apportioned its attorney's fees
and costs in its supporting affidavits. (R. 833.)
Two contracts in the litigation and U.R.C.P. Rule 37(b)(2)(D) provide Mobilight the
grounds for the trial court's award of attorney's fees. Mobilight's Property Protection
Agreement with K K Machinery and Mr. La Marr personally, and Mr. Rowe's separate
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Property Protection Agreement with Mobilight, each contains the same clause in Paragraph
No. 3 providing that if K K Machinery, Mr. La Marr, or Mr. Rowe breach their respective
agreements, that Mobilight shall be entitled to attorney's fees and costs. (R. 374, ^f 3; R. 376,
^f 3.) In its ruling granting Mobilight a preliminary injunction against the Appellants, the trial
court made a conclusion of law that the DayNight defendants had individually and/or
collectively breached the specific provisions of their respective agreements with Mobilight,
thereby entitling Mobilight to its attorney's fees and costs. (R. 596, ^[ 1.) In addition, the
trial court had authority to grant Mobilight its attorney's fees and costs by application of
Rule 37(g) as the sanction provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(D) to "order the party or the attorney to
pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure [to preserve
evidence] [.]" U.R.C.P, Rule 37(b)(2)(D).
Comparison of Mobilight's counsel's first affidavit to the second affidavit clarifies the
apportionment that was done. In the first affidavit, Mobilight's counsel specified that
Mobilight had incurred $92,209.75 in legal fees pertaining to Mobilight's successful
prosecution of its First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth claims for
relief. (R. 686, ^| 3.) In Mobilight's counsel's second affidavit, counsel clarified that
Mobilight had incurred $90,113.75 in legal fees pertaining to Mobilight's successful
prosecution of its First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth claims for
relief. (R. 784, ^| 3.) Mobilight's claimed expenses for expert fees and costs remained
constant in both affidavits in the total amounts of $3,464.90 for costs and $27,113.42 for
expert fees. (R. 686, ^ 3; R. 784, ^ 3.) Therefore, Mobilight claimed a total of $2,096.00 less
in the second affidavit in comparison to the first affidavit, which lesser sum accounted for
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the legal fees for work on claims Mobilight had not received default judgment upon that
Mobilight had inadvertently included in counsel's first affidavit.

The $2,096.00 difference

reflected apportionment for "(3) claims for which there is not entitlement for attorney's
fees," as required in Ellsworth Paulson Construction Co. v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App 353, f
47, 144 P.3d 261, as relied upon by Appellants. The $90,113.75 amount reflected "(1)
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees[.]" Id.
The subtraction of the $2,096.00 in attorney's fees in the second affidavit constituted
the apportionment to be done for "(2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been
an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful" and "(3) claims for which
there is no entitlement to attorney's fees" per Ellsworth. At the time of counsel's second
affidavit, Mobilight was not conclusively "unsuccessful" as to any claim in the action,
because all the claims in the case besides the several that the trial court granted Mobilight
default judgment upon had not been tried or finally decided. Likewise, as to "(3) claims for
which there is no entitlement to attorney fees," a party need not separate out its
compensable and non-compensable claims to the extent that they sufficiently overlap,
involving the same nucleus of facts. Truong v. Holmes, 2009 UT App 212, ^ [ 12-13, citing
Dejawe, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, ^ 20, 993 P.2d 222 (stating that where
litigation involves a contractual prevailing party attorney fee provision and includes "multiple
claims involving a common core of facts and related legal theories,. . . [the party] prevailing]
on at least some of its claims ... is entitled to compensation for all attorney fees reasonably
incurred in the litigation"). Here, Mobilight received default judgment for its Second Claim
for Relief for Breach of Duty of Loyalty against Mr. Rowe (R. 353), and its Third Claim for
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Relief for Conversion against Mr. Rowe (R. 354), and its Fifth Claim for Relief for Breach of
Contract involving the K K Machinery Distributor Agreement (R. 358), its Tenth Claim for
Relief for Injunctive Relief against all the DayNight parties (R. 366), and its Thirteenth Claim
for Relief for Destruction of Evidence against all the DayNight parties. (R. 369.) There is
no provision for attorney's fees applicable to any of those claims. However, each of those
listed claims is inextricably tied to the other claims Mobilight was granted default judgment
upon and which entide Mobilight to an award of attorney's fees and costs, i.e., its First Claim
for Relief for Breach of Contract (Property Protection Agreement) against Mr. Rowe (Tr.
350), its Fourth Claim for Relief for Breach of Contract (Property Protection Agreement)
against Mr. La Marr and K K Machinery (Tr. 356.), and its Sixth Claim for Relief for violation
of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act against all the DayNight Parties (Tr. 360.) The
Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Claims for Relief all involve a common nucleus
of facts and theories that overlap with the First, Fourth, and Sixth Claims for Relief.
Therefore, pursuant to Truong, Mobilight did not have to separate out its compensable and
non-compensable claims.
The invoice supporting Mobilight's counsel's second affidavit for attorney's fees and
costs cut out a number of entries in which Mobilight's counsel had inadvertendy included in
the invoice supporting counsel's first affidavit regarding fees for work on claims that
Mobilight had not been granted default judgment. For example, comparison for the entry of
attorney Rinehart Peshell's time on July 30, 2008, shows that his time was reduced from 1.5
hours to 1.3 hours to account for time mistakenly attributed to time spent working on
DayNight's trespass lawsuit versus Mobilight, and the description of work for Mr. Peshell's
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conference with Appellant's attorney Rick Ensor regarding DayNight's trespass claim was
cut out. (Compare R. 692 to R. 791.) For another example, comparison of the entry of
Attorney Rinehart Peshell's time on August 8, 2008, shows that his time was reduced from
1.50 hours to 1.40 hours, and the 0.1 hour spent working on Mobilight's Answer to
DayNight's Complaint was cut out. 8 (Compare R. 692 to R. 791.) Thus, comparison of the
first and second affidavits and the invoices supporting the affidavits confirms that
apportionment of fees was done.
The Appellant's main contention regarding the attorney's fee award pertains to the
alleged lack of explicit categorization of time and fees for "successful claims" for which
there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, "unsuccessful claims" for which there would
have been an entidement to attorney fees had the claims been successful, and "claims for
which there is not an entidement to attorney fees." (Aplt. Brf. at 27.) Importandy,
Appellants do not argue that the attorney's fee award for the work done by Mobilight's
counsel is excessive or otherwise unreasonable in light of the work done in the case and the
result achieved. Because the affidavits in support of attorney's fees included sufficient
apportionment and the remainder of the record contained sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's award for attorney's fees and costs, and because any error in the trial court's

8

Other time for work done on claims not included in the default judgment that were
inadvertendy listed in the invoice accompanying Mr. Peshell's first affidavit and were
removed in the invoice accompanying his second affidavit are found in entries for
November 5, 2008 for Mr. Peshell (compare R. 693 to R. 793), entries for November 10 and
14, 2008 for attorney Richard Matheson (compare R. 696 to R. 795), and entries for May 29
(Compare R. 697 to R. 796); July 22, 23, 25, 28, 31 (Compare R. 697-698 to r. 797-798);
August 1, 4, 8, 12, 20 (Compare R. 698-699 to R. 798-799); and November 6 and 10
(Compare R. 708-709 to R. 808) for attorney Jonathon Party.
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award of attorney's fees and costs was harmless, the award for attorney's fees and costs
contained in the Final Judgment should be affirmed.
A.

T H E ATTORNEY'S F E E AWARD IS SUPPORTED BY T H E
E V I D E N C E I N T H E RECORD.

Here, the vast majority of activity on the case up until the time of the judgment award
was focused on the eight claims upon which the trial court granted Mobilight summary
judgment. To the extent Mobilight's counsel spent time working on the other claims, that
time was not included in the Second Affidavit of Rinehart Peshell. Mr. Peshell specifically
testified in his second affidavit as follows:
12.
All of the attorneys fees and costs included in the invoice attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" were expended for the prosecution of the claims for
which Mobilight is entided to attorneys fees (the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Thirteenth Claims for Relief of Mobi-Light, Inc.'s First
Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (the trade secret-related
claims)) and in preparation for enforcement of judgment for Mobilight on
those claims. None of the attorneys fees or costs included in the attached invoice pertain to
work performed on the other claims contained in Mobilight's First Amended Counterclaim
and Third-Party Complainty nor with respect to the claims alleged by the DayNightparties
versus Mobilight
(R. 786-787, \ 12.) (Emphasis added.) Mr. Peshell further testified that the attorneys fees
and costs that accrued after November 14, 2008, included fees related to obtaining the
Court's sanctions order, opposing the DayNight parties' attempted interlocutory appeal of
the Court's Preliminary Injunction Order, and dealing with the DayNight parties' attempt to
remove the DayNight prototype light tower evidence out of the jurisdiction. (R. 787,1J13.)
Mr. Preshell further testified that the work of the private investigator and the charges
incurred for Lexis legal research costs, as reflected on the invoice, were incurred in direct
relation to Mobilight's trade secret-related claims. (R. 787, ]fl[ 14-15.)
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The trial court held an oral argument hearing on September 21, 2009, pertaining to
Mobilight's Motion for Entry of Judgment, including the issue of the award of attorney's
fees and costs, and reserved its ruling. (R. 829.)
Appellants complain that Mr. Peshell failed in his affidavit to specifically apportion
fees and costs incurred in litigating Mobilight's First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Tenth, and Thirteenth Claims for Relief in comparison to the other unresolved claims in the
case. (Aplt. Brf. 27-28.) However, the purpose of his second affidavit was to correct the
record following his first affidavit for attorney's fees and costs, in which Mobilight's law firm
mistakenly included some attorney's fees for claims unrelated to the eight claims upon which
the trial court granted judgment. (See R. 685-689.) Mobilight pointed out this error in its
reply brief in support of its motion for entry of final judgment. (R. 776.) Therefore, with
the record corrected, the evidence supported the trial court's award for attorney's fees and
costs in the amount of $120,692.07. There was no further apportionment that could be
completed beyond that included in counsel's second affidavit.
The cases Appellants rely upon for their argument regarding the requirement for
evidence of apportionment are distinguishable. For example, in El/sworfh, the case went
through a full bench trial, which decided all claims between the parties. 2006 UT App 353, ^|
9. In addition, the court there found that the breach of contract claim (for which there was
no recovery for attorney's fees) was so inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claim (for
which there was statutory authority for recovery of attorney's fees) as to warrant grouping
those fees together. Id., ^| 47. In comparison, the remaining claims in this case have not
gone to trial. The record as a whole reflects that Mobilight's counsel spent very little time, if
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any, working on the remaining claims and did not include them in Mr. PeshelTs second
affidavit. Virtually all the attorney's fees and costs that plaintiffs and Mobilight incurred
from the beginning of the case up through the time of the entry of the Final Judgment were
devoted to litigation of Mobilight's trade secret and spoliation claims. The remaining claims
in the case (i.e., those pertaining to K K Machinery's third-party counterclaims versus
Mobilight and Ross Johnson, and Mobilight's counterclaims versus K K Machinery) were left
essentially untouched up until the trial court's entry of the Final Judgment. When almost all,
if not all, of the legal services devoted to a case are necessary and relevant with respect to
issues a party succeeds upon for which it is entitled to attorney's fees, there is no error if
there is imperfect allocation of attorney's fees. See Burton Lumber <& Hardware Co. v. Graham,
2008 UT App 207, \ 31,186 P.3d 1012.
To further distinguish Appellants' cases, in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266
(Utah 1992), the record was "sparse," as the attorney's fee affidavit failed to delineate such
basic information as the nature of the work performed, the amount of attorney time
expended, and the hourly billing rate. Id. at 269. Here, Mobilight's counsel submitted a
detailed affidavit with an attached invoice including precise descriptions of the work
performed, the amount of attorney time expended, and the hourly billing rates.
Finally, in Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998), also went all the way through to
trial. Id. at 54. The contract at issue in that case only authorized fees to be collected for time
expended in remedying a default in the purchase agreement, but the attorney's affidavit
included several entries of fees for services relating to the noncontract, tortious interference
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claims. Id. at 55-56. Here, Mobilight's counsel's affidavit did not include time for claims not
pertaining to the successful default judgment claims.
B.

T H E TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY C O N S I D E R E D A N D
F O U N D T H A T MOBILIGHT'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES WAS SUFFICIENTLY A P P O R T I O N E D A N D T H A T T H E
A M O U N T I N C U R R E D WAS REASONABLE.

The trial court made plain in its November 10, 2009, Memorandum Decision
granting the Final Judgment that the court had carefully reviewed Mobilight's counsel's
affidavits in support of the requested attorney's fees and costs award, and was satisfied that
the "apportioned" amount of fees sought was appropriate, and that the amount of fees and
costs requested were reasonable in light of the complexity of the case and scope of litigation.
The trial court stated as follows:
After reviewing counsel's Affidavits regarding fees and the attached statements, the
Court determines that the apportioned amount of fees sought is appropriate and
necessarily incurred in furtherance of Mobilight's trade secret-related claims. Further,
as attested to in counsel's Second Affidavit, at least a portion of the fees incurred
related to apparent attempts to remove certain evidence out of this jurisdiction.
These actions necessitated investigatory work and monitoring of the parties to ensure
compliance with the Court's Orders. Overall, the Court determines that Mobilight is
entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs and that the amount of such fees and costs
requested are reasonable in light of the complexity of this case and the scope of the
litigation.
(R. 833.) (Emphasis added.)
C.

A N Y T E C H N I C A L DEFICIENCY I N A P P O R T I O N M E N T OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES I N T H E SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS WAS
HARMLESS ERROR.

Because the record confirms that the trial court carefully reviewed Mobilight's
application for attorney's fees and costs, and found that the attorney's fees were adequately
apportioned, any technical deficiency in Mobilight's affidavits and the trial court's
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consideration of those affidavits with respect to specific claims for relief in the case was
harmless. Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no
reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. State v. Spillers, 2007
UT 13, ^| 24, 152 P.3d 315. Harmless error analysis applies to awards for attorney's fees. See
Hallv. NACMIntemountain,

1999 UT 97,fflf20-21, 988 P.2d 942. Indeed, an appellate court

may uphold a fee award when no findings of fact have been entered on the record when it
would be reasonable to assume that such findings actually had been made. Foote, 962 P.2d at
56, citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah Dec. 5, 1997). 9
Here, the trial court noted in its November 10, 2009, Memorandum Decision that it
reviewed the second affidavit of Mobilight's counsel submitted in support of Mobilight's
request for judgment for its attorney's fees and costs, and that the plaintiffs had argued that
Mobilight had allegedly failed to properly apportion its fees and had allegedly provided only
"vague and unclear" descriptions of the underlying legal work. (R. 833.) Therefore, there is
no doubt that the trial court was aware of and thoroughly considered the issue.

9

In cases in which factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by the trial court but
no findings . . . appear in the record, we "assume that the trier of facts found them in accord
with its decision, and we affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to
find facts to support it." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah Dec. 5,1997),
citing State v. Kamire^ 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (quoting Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1,
245 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah 1952)) (additional citations omitted). Under Ramire^ "this court
upholds the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." 817 P.2d at 788 n.6.
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IV.

MOBILIGHT IS E N T I T L E D T O ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES A N D COSTS
O N APPEAL.
Mobilight respectfully requests the Court grant Mobilight its attorney's fees and costs

incurred with respect to Appellants' appeal. As noted supra, Mobilight is entitled to its
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to its successful prosecution of its statutory trade secret
claim, pursuant to the attorney's fees and costs provision in its Property Protection
Agreement with Mr. La Marr and KK Machinery, its successful UUTSA claim, and pursuant
to Rule 37(b)(2)(D). The contractual obligation to pay attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a
contract should include those incurred on appeal. Management Sews. Corp. v. Development
Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408 - 409 (Utah 1980). "[W]hen a party who received attorney fees
below prevails on appeal, 'the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.'"
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (quoting Utah Dep't ofSoc. Sews. v. Adams,
806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). Here, Mobilight received judgment for its
attorney's fees, and it is entitled to its attorney's fees on appeal should the Court affirm.
CONCLUSION
The trial court acted within its discretion in applying Rule 37(g) and imposing default
judgment against the DayNight Parties as sanction against the DayNight Parties for the
intentional destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop computer. The trial had the inherent authority
to issue the sanction, the severity of which was appropriate given Mr. La Marr's and Mr.
Rowe's bad faith and intentional conduct.
The trial court also acted within its discretion in granting Mobilight final judgment in
the amount of $120,692.07 for the reasonable amount of attorney's fees and costs it incurred
in obtaining the default judgment. Mobilight's request for attorney's fees was supported by
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affidavit that apportioned fees as required. The trial court explicitly stated it considered the
issue of attorney's fees, found that there was appropriate apportionment, and found that the
fees were reasonable.
Accordingly, the Final Judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this^z: day of August, 2010.
MATHESON & PESHELL, LLC

Rir
Richard M. Matheson
Jonathon D. Party, Of Counsel
Attorneysfor Appellee Mobi-Ught, Inc.
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Mobi-Light, Inc., were delivered by United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Richard F. Ensor
Kari A. Tuft
Vantus Law Group, P.C.
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45

/)
^
(Ahi^c/OCty?

^£<

s^?

9*

S***'A

Tab A

COMMERCE AND TRADE

565

(i) a cease and desist order; and
(ii) a n administrative fine of u p to $2,500 for each
separate violation that is not a violation described in
Subsection 13-23~5(2){e) u p to $10,000 for any series
of violations arising out of the same operative facts,
(b) All administrative fines collected under this chapter
shall be deposited in the Consumer Protection Education
and Training Fund created in Section 13-2-8.
3oo5
C H A P T E R 24
U M F O R M TRADE S E C E E T S A C T
Section
13-24-1.
13-242.
13-24-3.
13-24-4.
13-24-5.
13-24*6.
13-24-7.
13-24-8.
13-24-9.

Short title.
Definitions.
Injunctive relief.
Damages.
Attorneys' fees.
Preservation of secrecy.
Statute of limitations.
Effect on other law.
Uniformity of application and construction.

13-24-1, Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Trade Secrets Act."
18-24-2, Definitions.
As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) "Improper means* includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other
means,
(2) "Misappropriation" means:
(a) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a
person who knows or h a s reason to know that tha
trade secret was acquired hy improper means; or
(b) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another
without express or implied consent by a person who:
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge
of the trade secret; or
(ii) a t the time of disclosure or use, knew or
had reason to know that his knowledge of the
trade secret was:
(A) derived from or through a person who
had utilized improper means to acquire it;
(B) acquired under circumstances giving
rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit
its use; or
(C) derived from or through a person who
owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(iii) before a material change of his position,
knew or had reason to know t h a t it was a trade
secret and that knowledge of it h a d been acquired by accident or mistake,
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint
venture, government, governmental subdivision or
agency, or any other legal or commercial entity,
(4) "Trade .secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that:
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable hy proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and

13-24-8

(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
1989

13-24-3. Injunctive relief.
(1) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.
Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be terminated when t h e trade secret has ceased to exist, b u t t h e
injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable
period of time in order to eliminate Commercial advantage
that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation.
(2) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no
longer than the period of time for which use could have been
prohibited. Exceptional circumstances include, b u t are not
limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position prior
to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation
that renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable.
(3) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect
a trade secret may be compelled by court order.
198»
13-24-4. D a m a g e s .
(1) Except to t h e extent that a material and prejudicial
change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to
know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for
misappropriation. Damages can include both t h e actual loss
caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused
by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. In lieu of damages measured by any other
methods, t h e damages caused by misappropriation m a y be
measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for
a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade
secret.
(2) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the
court may award exemplary damages in an amount not
exceeding twice any award made under Subsection (1). xsss
18-24-5. Attorneys'fees.
If a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, a motion
to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or
willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may
award reasonable attorneys* fees to the prevailing party. 1989
13-24-6. Preservation of secrecy.
In an action under this chapter, a court shall preserve the
secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means, which
may include granting protective orders in connection with
discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing
the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in
the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without
prior court approval.
isss
13-24-7. Statute of limitations.
An action for misappropriation shall be brought within
three years after the misappropriation is discovered or, by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.
For the purposes of this section, a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim.
i»8&
13-24-8, Effect on other law,
(1) Except a s provided in Subsection (2), this chapter displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this
state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade
secret.
(2) This chapter does not affect:
(a) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret;
(b) other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or

13-24-9
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(c) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.
1989
13-24-9, Uniformity of application and construction.
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
subject of the chapter among states enacting it.
i98d
CHAPTER 25
AUTOMATED DIALING TELEPHONE SOLICITATION
[EEPEALEDj
13-25-1 to 13-25-5. Repealed.

laae

CHAPTER 25a
TELEPHONE AND FACSIMILE SOLICITATION ACT
Section
13-25a-10I.
13-25a-102,
13-25a-103.
13-25a-104.
13-25a-105.
13-25a-lG6.
13-25a-lG7,
13-25a-107.2.
13-25a~108,
13-25a-109.
13-25a-110.
13-25a-lll.

Title.
Definitions.
Prohibited conduct for telephone solicitations
— Exceptions.
Prohibited conduct for facsimiles — Exceptions.
Penalties — Administrative and criminal.
Enforcement.
Private action.
Requests to a specific telephone solicitor.
Objections to telephone solicitations.
No-call database.
Repealed.
Exemptions.

13-25a-10L Title.
This chapter is known as the "Telephone and Facsimile
Solicitation Act*
1996
13-25a-102» Definitions,
As used in this chapter;
(1) "Advertisement" means material offering for sale,
or advertising the availability or quality of, any property,
goods, or services,
,
(2) (a) "Automated telephone dialing system" means
equipment used to:
(i) store or produce telephone numbers;
(ii) call a stored or produced number; and
(iii) connect the number called with a recorded
message or artificial voice,
(b) "Automated telephone dialing system" does not
include equipment used with a burglar alarm system,
voice messaging system, fire alarm system, or other
system used in an emergency involving the immediate health or safety of a person.
(3) "Division" means the Division of Consumer Protection in the Department of Commerce.
(4) (a) "Established business relationship* means a
relationship that:
(i) is based on inquiry, application, purchase,
or transaction regarding products or services
offered;
(ii) is formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a person making a telephone
solicitation and a person to whom a telephone
solicitation is made; and
(iii) has not been terminated by:
(A) an act by either party; or
(B) the passage of 18 months since the
most xecent inquiry, application, purchase,
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transaction, or voluntary two-way communication,
(b) "Established business relationship'5 includes a
relationship with an affiliate as defined in Section
16-10a-102.
(5) "Facsimile machine" means equipment used for.
(a) scanning or encoding text or images for conversion into electronic signals for transmission; or
(b) receiving electronic signals and reproducing
them as a duplicate of the original text or image.
(6) "Negative response" means a statement from a
party stating the party does not wish to listen to the sales
presentation or participate in the solicitation presented in
the telephone call.
(7) "Telephone solicitation" means the initiation of a
telephone call or message for a commercial purpose or to
seek a financial donation, including calls:
(a) encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, regardless
of whether the transaction involves a nonprofit organization;
(b) soliciting a sale of or extension of credit for
property or services to the person called;
(c) soliciting information that will be used for:
(i) the direct solicitation of a sale of property
or services to the person called; or
(ii) an extension of credit to the person called
for a sale of property or services; or
(d) soliciting a charitable donation involving the
exchange of any premium, prise, gift, ticket, subscription, or other benefit in connection with any appeal
made for a charitable purpose.
(8) "Telephone solicitor" means any natural person,
firm, organization, partnership, association, or corporation who makes or causes to be made an unsolicited
telephone call, including calls made by use of an automated telephone dialing system.
(9) "Unsolicited telephone calF means a telephone call
for a commercial purpose or to seek a financial donation
other than a call made:
(a) in response to an express request of the person
called;
(b) primarily in connection with an existing debt or
contract, payment or performance of which has not
been completed at the time of the call;
(c) to any person with whom the telephone solicitor
has an established business relationship; or
(d) as required by law for a medical purpose. 2003
13~25a-103. Prohibited conduct for telephone solicitations — Exceptions.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a person may not
operate or authorize the operation of an automated telephone
dialing system to make a telephone solicitation.
(2) A person may operate an automated telephone dialing
system if a call is made:
(a) with the prior express consent of the person who is
called agreeing to receive a telephone solicitation from a
specific solicitor; or
(b) to a person with whom the solicitor has an established business relationship,
(3) A person may not make a telephone solicitation to a
residential telephone without prior express consent during
any of the following times:
(a) before 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m. local time;
(b) on a Sunday; or
(c) on a legal holiday.
(4) A person may not make or authorize a telephone solicitation in violation of Title 47 U.S.C. 227.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAYNIGHT, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company,
Plaintiff & Counterclaim
Defendant,
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s

CASE NO-

080913997

:

vs.

:

MOBI-LIGHT, INC., a Utah
corporation,

?

Defendant & Counterclaim
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

*

KICK MACHINERY PTY, LTD., a foreign :
corporation, W. CORY ROWE, an
individual, and PAUL "CACTUS JACK" J
LA MARR, an individual,
Third Party Defendants.
vs.
MOBILIGHT, INC., and ROSS JOHNSON,
Third Party Counterclaim
Defendants.

:

This matter came before the Court for hearing on September 21, 2009,
in connection with defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Mobi-Light,
Inc.'s

{"Mobilight") Motion

for Entry of Final Judgment.

At

the

conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the .matter under advisement to
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further consider the relevant legal authorities, the parties' written
submissions and counsel's oral argument.

Being now fully informed, the

Court rules as stated herein.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The

first

issue

raised

by

Mobilight's

Motion

is

whether

certification of the Final Judgment is appropriate under Rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Mobilight has cited the Court to a

number of decisions which have discussed the requirements of Rule 54(b)
and the' Court has now had an opportunity to review those cases*

The

plaintiff and counterclaim defendants (these parties are collectively
referred to as the "plaintiff") does not dispute that the principal
requirements of Rule 54 (b) have been met because there are multiple
claims for relief and multiple parties.

However, it argues that the

Court should exercise its discretion in denying certification because the
claims which remain stem from the same core set of facts and cannot be
considered separate from the claims upon which Mobilight requests entry
of Pinal Judgment.
determines

that

The Court is not persuaded by this argument and

the claims remaining

in this case do not

overlap

factually or legally with the claims that Mobilight seeks Judgment upon.
Further, the Court expressly determines that there is ho just reason for
delay. Accordingly, Mobilight's request for Rule 54(b) certification is
granted>
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The next issue raised by Mobilight's Motion concerns the amount of
attorney's fees sought by Mobilight. The plaintiff initially argued that
Mobilight has failed to properly apportion its fees and has provided only
vague and unclear descriptions of the underlying legal work. Subsequent
to the plaintiff's filing of its Opposition, Mobilight provided a Second
Affidavit regarding attorney's fees and costs which apportions and limits
the fees requested to the trade secret-related claims. Nevertheless, the
plaintiff maintains that the basis for apportionment remains unclear.
The plaintiff also challenges research and other work performed after the
preliminary injunction.
After reviewing counsel's Affidavits regarding fees and the attached
statements, the Court determines that the apportioned amount of fees
sought

is

appropriate

and

necessarily

Mobilight's trade secret-related claims.

incurred

in

furtherance

of

Further, as attested to in

counsel's Second Affidavit, at least a portion of the fees incurred
related to apparent attempts to remove certain evidence out of this
jurisdiction.

These

actions

necessitated

investigatory

work

and

monitoring of the parties to ensure compliance with the Court's Orders.
Overall, the Court determines that Mobilight is entitled to an award of
attorney's fees and costs and that the amount of such fees and costs
requested are reasonable in light of the complexity of this case and the
scope of the litigation.
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The final issue raised by Mobilight's Motion is whether Mobilight
should be granted a permanent injunction.

The plaintiff contends that

the proposed Final Judgment is broadly worded and could be construed as
virtually prohibiting DayNight, LLC, from working in the light tower
industry for an indefinite amount of time. The Court concludes that the
form of the Final Judgment has the requisite specificity and properly
focuses on the use or disclosure of trade secrets.

Consistent with the

Court's prior decisions, the Court determines that there is a "cognizable
danger" that the plaintiff may further misappropriate Mobilight's trade
secrets in the future, particularly since the trade secrets which were
misappropriated were contained in an electronic format.
Communications, Inc. v. Chiang, 608 F.Supp.2d

1270

See ClearOne
(D. Utah 2009).

Accordingly, the Court enters a permanent injunction as requested in the
proposed Final Judgment.

As a corollary, the Court grants Mobilight's

Motion for Order Exonerating T.R.O. Bond.
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court,
granting Mobilight's Motion for Entry of Final Judgment. The Court will
require Mobilight to resubmit the proposed Final Judgment and Order
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T.R.O.
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Bond within

five

(5) days

of

service

of

this

Memorandum Decision.
Dated this

10

day of November, 2009.

2*

TYRONE E. MEDLEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE/"

•S2£
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1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this
November, 2009:

Richard F. Ensor
Attorney for Plaintiff
3165 E. Millrock Drive, Suite 160
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Rinehart L. Peshell
Richard M. Matheson
Jonathon D. Parry
Attorneys for Defendant
5383 South 900 East, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

day of

